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Statement of nurnose:
I prooose to appraise the book Individual Behaviord,y Donald Snygg
and Arthur U. Combs from the standuoint of its fitness for use as a
text book for young students.

I shall attem~t to show that 1) the

language used in the book is confusing, and that 2) it tends to
weaken the conceotion of truth which a student might have, and
that 3) the text boo'k: makes no provision for man's s;:,i.ritual need
in its theory of education.
I.
II.

III.
IV.

Man has a s~iritual need.
The terminology used in the text is confusing.
A.

The word phenomenology and its related terms is mis-used.

:9.

The word fact is giv13n a different :meaning, which may alter
the thinking of a student in a way that may be detriMental to him in later life.

C.

The meaning of the word experience is not sufficiently
clarified for the student.

D.

The term reality has been perverted.

E.

The term differentiation seems to be just a new way of
expressing an old concept.

The text book weakens a student's recognition of truth.
The text book overlooks man's spiritual need which can be
nourished by Poetry, history,and nature.
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AN APPRAISAL OF A CURRENT TREND IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY
AS PRESEN'l'ED IN A RECENT TEXTBOOK

"Wahrheit und Dichtung"
( "'Iruth of fact and truth of poet.ry11 )

In a speed-driven, space-conscious, rear-ridden world Educators
today are aware of their responsibility to man as never before and
are desperately seeking ways to avert this civilization's self'-

destruction.

A study

of the history or education from earliest

known records till now shows that teachers have always felt a
certain responsibility to man, have always sought better ways to
teach, and have varied their methods hopefully with the changing
times and demands.

But urgency has never been or the essence as

it is today.
The educational aim thus tar through the ages has been a common
one and has been a direct result of man's creative or spiritual
"instinct." This "instinct" may be thought of in a number of ways
and may be verbalized in a number of ways.

It may be caJ.led man's

urge to climb or to reach higher or to attain a better status; man's
longing to lmow Truth--his inborn curiosity which will not be denied
and which makes him forever ask "Why? 11 ; man's awareness of Good--a
certainty that there~ something better and his need to find it;
his awareness of a conflict within him--the material puJ.ling against
the spiritua.L; and some wiJ.l call this creative instinct simply an
awareness of the lmowability of things--man's need to acquire
!mow.Ledge.
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Many

psychologists today incline to the theory that man's onl.y

urge is his .fundamental and basic need to "maintain and enhance seu. 111
They describe him as a creature of his environment rather than as
potential.ly the creator of his environment.

Whatever the difference

today in educational theory., educators do agree on the unique quality
of the probl.em facing them. Whereas aJ.l teachers of different eras
in the past have shared a common probl.em of improving the species.,

today's educators face a unique problem--that of keeping the species
on the face of the earth.

The immediacy of such a problem is obvious

since total annihiJ.ation does not threaten us in one hundred years,
in fifty years., or in one year; it threatens us now.
time al.lowabJ.e for costly mistakes.

There is not

There is only a need--urgent

and critical--for a sound, strong, and universal phiJ.osophy of education.

We must decide now where we want to go., educationally., and

go there in as straight a line as possible.
It seems to me that the main difficulty inevitably encountered
in deciding upon an acceptabJ.e phiJ.osophy of education stems from
the above mentioned question of whether or not man can create or inf'J.uence appreciably his own environment., whether or not man has a
choice in his actions., and whether or not it is desirable that he
continue to feel as he has in the past that he is capab.le of exercising a will in governing his own behavior.

Adopting a purely

environmentalist view as a sol.e theory wouJ.d tend to keep educators

1. Individual Behavior., Donald Seygg and Arthur U. Combs., New York,
Harper and Brothers., 1949, p. 63.
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concerned with behaviorism., the aim being to observe., permit., infer.,
predict and discuss a!! kinds of behavior clinically and scientifica!ly.

I have labelled this type of educator "behaviorist" because

he seems more intrigued with the festering sores or the behavior
itself than he is with feeding the undernourished mind.

Unti! the

spirit and mind are nourished., outward manifestations of an inner
deficiency wi!l persist and the "behaviorist" wi.ll have 11busy work"
in plenty.

The salve of 11permissiveness 11 is their key remedy, whi!e

food for the mind is neglected.
The existence of sharply differing viewpoints or theories among
educators has not till now seemed so crucial; but due to the uniqueness and immediacy of humanity's present dilemna, a decision nmst
be made as to what philosophy- is best.

Therefore a carefu.L considera-

tion of the way we seem to be heading shou!d be in order.

In order

to show the inherent limitations and potentially demoralizing

implications of the behaviorist interpretation of experience, I
have sel.ected a current textbook in the fie!d of educational
psychology. 2 I sha!l criticize this text on the grounds that it
tends to be confusing to a young student both in language used and
in ideas expressed; I sha!l secondly try to show that such a behaviorist approach tends to neglect two very important "foods"
which can and shou!d be administered to individuals as a means
of combatting behavior probl.ems at their source. There are

many

such ways of strengthening a young person's mind as for example

2.

Individua! Behavior, Donald Snygg and Arthur U. Combs!t
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through acquiring knowledge of and proficiency in mathematics,
science, or music.

But I have picked the two important fields of

Poetry (literature) and history to illustrate

my

theory that Snygg

and Comb~ so-called "phenomenological" approach is not adequate if
used as a sole theory of education.
My

purpose in placing principal emphasis on the terminology

used by the authors is to show that often the whole meaning of a
book may be obscured by Pedaguese ;3 that young people may accept
such a book blindly, confused by its display of Pedaguese; that
because of such unthinking acceptance, a who.Le crop of be.Lievers
may mushroom up like a cult and

may

use the catch-phrases, half-

truths, and not-understood ideas with bad results. If the weakness
in one such behaviorist text book can be shown, perhaps an improved
and supplemented educational philosophy will result.
I believe Snygg and Combs• text may be confusing to students

because new meanings have been applied to old terms and those new
meanings have not been correctly redefined and, in some instances,
correctly used.
1.

The tenn phenomenology and its related tenns as used in
Individual Behavior.

3. "But teaching is still a new vocation; and the teachers .Long for
the time when their business sha.L.L be recognized as a profession.
To this end many of them feel that they nm.st magnify their dal.Ling
and confound the uninitiated with a wondrous technicality of language.
It is but natural. They must invent such a language, whether or not ·
there are ideas to justify it. They have invented it. It is Pedaguese."
A Joysome History of Education, Weiland Hendrich, New York,
A. G.-Seller, 1925, p. 78'.

5
Whenever a new fiel.d of lmowledge is discovered, new terms
have to be coined:

a name or sign must be invented to stand for

the newly discovered thing or idea.

For example the words googool.,

megaton, radar, and loran are new terms for new things recently discovered in new fields.

That is the usual and respected procedure for

forming a scientific vocabulary and it makes possible the transmitting
of new lmowledge. A correct and common understanding of what those
words mean is required before lmowledge of new facts can be spread
or before science can become what its name signifies:

a lmowing.

But when a term already coined and in good usage which represents
one idea or class of things is borrowed by a teacher and applied to

a different concept or class of things, the procedure cannot be said

to be scientific, and further, a confusion in the student's mind tends
to occur.

The word phenomenology with all its related terms is not a

new word.

It derives from the Greek and its histor,y is as oJ.d.

Defi-

nitions and explanations of the terms as given in Webster's!:!
International Dictionarz1' are as follows:
phenomenology: 1.

The branch of a science dealing with the
description and classification of phenomena.
2. Scientific description of actual phenomena,
with avoidance of ail interpretation, explanation, and evaluation.

phenomenon:

(phil.) An:, object lmown through the senses
rather than through thought or intuition.
Cf. Noumenon.
2. Any observabJ.e fact or event; specifica.i.fy:
a) in scientific usage, any fact or event
of' scientific interest susceptible of
scientific description and explanation; b)
in a secondar,y use in science, a rare fact
or event, or one of unique significance.

1.

4. Note: Unless otherwise stated Webster's New International

Dictionary is the authority consulted for all dictionary definitions
in this paper.
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nhenomenal:

Of, ?ertaining to, or of the nature
specifically: a) Known through the
than through thought or intuition.
with observed data rlither than wlth
phenomenal science.

of a phenomenon;
senses rather
b) Concerned
hypotheses; as,

phenomenalism: (nhil.) a) The theory that limits knowledge to
phenomena only. b) The theorJ that we lmow only
phenomena and that there is no existence except
the phenomenal.
Bearing in mind that phenomenology is a branch of science dealing
~1th scientific description of actual phenomena with avoidance of all
interpretation, explanation, and evaluation, and that phenomena are
observable facts or events known through the senses, it should be
obvious that Sqvgg and Combs tend to be confusing in their use of
these terms .,,hen the following exerpts from the text in que~tion are
read thoughtfully •
• • • We h~ve described the external approach to human
behavior as observing behavior from an outsider's point of
view. There is another way in which we can observe behavior,
however, which we shall examine in th.Is volume. That is, we
may observe human behavior not from an outsider's point of
view but from the point of view of the behaver himself. This
frame of reference has sometimes been called the nhenomenological approach and sometimes the personal anproach to behavior.
(pp. 8, 9.)
In the personal frame of reference we attemnt to observe
beh~vior from the point of view of the individual himself.
(p. 10)

In choosing between the ext~rnal and the phenomenological
points of vigw the only question a psychologist has to 3sk is
"Which is the more effect,ive frame of reference for the nrediction of human cehavior? 11 (-;,. 12) 7'rhe ''external" approach
has been previously defined by the authors as the approach
which observes behavior from an outsider's point of view. o. 8::/
I wish to point out here that from the very denotation of the
word observe there is no other vi~oint possible but an external
one.

Observing behavior means to note or watch or see behavior and
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requires an observer whom I shall call A and the behaver whom I shall
call B.

There is no other way for! to observe except with his own

eyes or from an "external" viewpoint.
or ever know B's private world."

!

A can not see inside B's mind

can only imagine, judge, o:r guess

at B's world and he is therefore not observing facts or ~vents at all.

!

is instead using his own experience, knowledge, imagination, and

powers of inference plus what little he can truly observe of B's
visible behavior to explain and predict B's future behavior.

This

necessitates "interpretation, explanation, and evaluation" of facts
which ~re completely unobservable and phenomenology as Sn;ygg and Combs
use it is in direct contradiction to its dictionary definition.
fore, confusion may exist in a student's mind when he reads:

There-

"In the

personal frame of reference we" (!_) "attempt to observe behavior from
the point of view of the individual" (~) "himself," or that "~ may
observe behavior not from an outsider's point of view but from the
point of view of the behaver himself. 11

Since, then, B's

11

phenomenan

or facts and events can never be scientifically observed (either by
himself or by!_) and can only be imaginatively inferred by!_ and
unscientifically recalled by~ through introspection, why is either
of the terms

11

nhenomenology11 or "science" applied to the anproach

set forth by Snygg and Combs.

Use of the term ttpersonal" alone

would seem to be a more accurate description and therefore less
confusing.
Having established in the beginning of their text that the
phenomena being discussed are those ?ertaining to~ only and hence
unobservable (a completely new and different definition being required), SI13rgg and Combs continue to use from time to time the
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orthodox meaning of the term phenomena which adds to the confusion
already created:
The phenomena of physics were accordingly purged of all
characteristics which are not reducible to length. As a result, the world of the physical sciences, after Galileo,
consisted of only those aspects of phenomena which can be
expressed in units of length • • • • If phenomena could not
be measured in terms of length they could not be dealt with
by methods of physics • • • • All (measurements) ••• are
observed by the scientist from the same point • • • • Since
any t190 qualified observers viewing a situation from the
same time must necessarily agree closely in their measurements of length a great area of agreement was discovered
by the physicists as soon as they began to ignore all other
aspects of phenomena. (pn. 339-340, passim.)
It is obvious that in the latter quot.11tions Snygg and Combs are
using the word phenomena to mean "any observable fact or event • • •
of scientific interest susceptible of scientific description and
explanation." (dictionary)
"When is a nhenomenon not

One is tempted to ask 'facetiously,
I'!

Phenomenon?", the answer being, "When

the term is used by 1Phenomenologists 1 • •l
Armed with the rtpersonal a'Oproach1• definition of a phenomenologist, a student next comes to an explanation in the text of
phenomenal fields:
By the phenomenal field we mean the entire universe,
including himself, as it is experienced by the individual
at the instant of action. (p. 15)
All behavior, without excention, is completely determined by and pertinent to the phenomenal field of the
behaving organism. (p. 15)
••• the Phenomenal field is • • • simply the universe of naive experience in which each individual lives
• • • • No matter what wa are told, our own phenomenal
field will always seem real, substantial, and solid to
us. It is the only field and oniy reality we can directly
experience. It includes all the universe of which we are
aware--including not only the physical entities which
exist for us but such other entities as justice, injustice,
and ~ublic opinion. (pp. 15, 16)
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But since the phenomenal field of~ can never be observed and
since A who is observing~ behavior cannot observe B's phenomena
and can only interpret !!, from his own (A •s) seemingly "'real, substantial, and solid" field, (see above quotation, p. 16) and since
A

must use his own thought to imagine B's field, there is no true

scientific phenomena involved and the process used to ~redict behavior
should not be called phenomenology at all if the dictionary definitions
are valid.

Since .Snygg and Combs depend so much on reasoning and

imagination in their theory of the understanding and prediction of
behavior, it seems to me -they might cause confusion in the mind of
a

student who reads in the dictionary that phenomenology is concerned

with scientifically observable facts or events with 1tavoidance of all
interpretation, explanation, and evaluation."
2.

The term fact as used in Individual Behavior.

Since phenomena are "observable facts or events," we must understand what is meant by fact if we expect to use the word phenomenology.
Dictionary definitions of the word fact ~re as follows:

1. A thing done; deed; (obsolete)
2. Tr~t which has actual existence; an event.
J. The quality of being actual; actuality; -as, the
realm of fact is distinct from that of fancy.
4. The statement of a thing done or existing; as,
his facts are false; loosely, the things supposed (even though falsely) to be done or to
exist.
Bertrand Russell's definition of fact:
I mean by a 'fact• something which is there whether
anybody thinks so or not ••• Facts are what make statements
true or false ••• Most facts are indenendent of our volitions;
that is why they are called 'hard', 'stubborn' or 'ineluctable.'
Physical facts • • • are independent, not only of our volitions
but even of our existence.5

5. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, New York, Harner and Brothers,
19h9, PP• 1420158, pas~
i'

"")I
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Snygg and Com~'s_definition o f ~ :
Science is constantly seeking for facts; but in the lRst
few years we have come to understiind facts in a new way. A
fact, we find, is not an independent thing that we can memorize and depend U?On and know that it will always be true.
It is true only in its frame of reference, which means that
it is false in others. What one thinks of as fact depends
u,on the frame of reference from which he makes his observations. (In~ividual Behavior, p. 4)
Having thus redefined~ for the student as something not to
be depended upon and as something which is "true only in its frame
of reference" etc., Snygg and Combs proceed to use the term fact
in varying ways throughout the book.
arise in a student's mind:

The question must naturally

When are the authors using the accepted

definition of fact as being something which has "actuality"
(dictionary) and something which exists nwhether anybody thinks so
or not," (Russell), and when are they using their

own

definition

of fact as being a thing which is "true only in its frame of
reference, which

~

that it is false_..!.!! .others"? Are not

Snygg and Combs defining and thinking of illusion, not fact? 6
The following quotations are passages taken from the text
in which the use of the word fact might confuse a student who had
been oreviously grounded in the belief that facts "are what make
statements true or false" regardless of whether anybody thought
so or not, and regardless cf anyone's "phenomenal field. 11

6. Webster's

Ne'\'r Collegiate Dictionary definition of illusion:
a perceotion which fails to give the true character of an object
oerceived.
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Science is constantly seeking for facts.

(p. 4)

It seems clear that a science must do more than collect facts.
(p. 5)

Facts previously unobserved acquire meaning and recognition, and
they in turn make possible the discovery of new facts and relations.
(p. 5)
The progress of sc:i.ence • • • • is in two directions. The first
is toward the discovery of new facts. This unceasing search is continually turning up new facts inexplicable in the old frames of
reference. In turn, the scientist is forced to develop new frames
of reference wide enou£h to encompass the greatest number of known
facts at any moment./ Known facts? But according to their definition
above, ~ge 4, facts cannot be depended upon or knOffll as true.7 Once
a more adequate frame of reference has been achieved, its effectiveness
is soon demonstrated by the discovery of a great number of new facts
and relations. (p. 5)
let us examine this prindple by examining Fig. 1. As man
reached a ooint in his development where it became necessary for him
to deal with numbers of things, represented in our figure by the marks from
A to B, he develoned a number system,
renrese.ated by the triangle ABC. The
development of this number system makes
it nossible for him to deal with his
environment more effectively than before and to understand many new concepts.
In time, however, this number system
became inadequate as new facts were
discovered and new needs arose, represented in our figure by thl3 marks from
B to D. ThP-se new facts - /ictual?7
could not be dealt with in the oldnumber system and out of this need
a new frame of reference, ADE, was
developed, called algebra. The new
frane of reference did n o t ~ what
had gone before 7cf7above the statement that a fact-is "true in its frame of reference, which means it is
false in other's: pAee 4.7 But even this frame of reference could not
last forever and soon !IIB.n 1 s ins~tiable striving made it. necessary to
deal with still ::nore new facts and problems, D to F. This in turn led
to the development of still another frame cf reference, AFG, which
mathematicians know as calculus. This relationship of facts and frames
of reference is characteristic of the Progress of science. Through the
continuous search for facts and frames of reference in which they can
be comprehended the frontiers of knowledge are ~ushed forward. (pp. 5-6)
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Some study of the above paragranhs together with the illustration,
Fig. 1., will m!lke it apparent that Snygg and Combs were using the
accepted concept of fact in develoning their own idea of fact as that
which is "true only in its own frame of reference, which means that it
is false in others • 11

Figura 1. does illustrate the way in which man's

knowledge enlarges through discovery of additional facts, (orthodox
definition), b11t it does not illustrate the point which the authors
claim to illustrate which is:
we • • •

true.

a fact is not an "independent thing

can depend upon as true and know that it will always be

It is true only in its frame of reference, which means that

it is false in others."

Fig. 1. shows quite clearly that AB (numbers

of things) is still depended upon and known to be fact, that ABC, number system, and ADC, algebra, are not only true in their "new frame of
reference" (Snygg and Combs) but they remain true and are to be depended uoon as true in the total and enlarged ''frame of reference"
which Snygg and Combs denote by AFG.

The illustration shows that

facts which are true remain true even when a frame of reference is
extended or enlarged by the addition of new facts.

But Snygg and

Combs say they are showing by Fig. 1. that "facts are true only
in their frame of reference which means that they are false in others.it
(p. h)

I believe that to take a term so firmly fixed in the student's
mind as the word fact and attempt to give it a different meaning and
at the same time to continue ~o use it inconsistently throughout the
text may be confusing.

It might be better to coin a new term which

would denote something which seems to be true but which instead is
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as variable as the people existing on this earth today--a term which
would denote a thing completely lacking in the quality of actuality,
trueness, or "isness."

A

young student who is encouraged to believe

that actual truth does not exist, that a fact is alwa:rs only what it
seems to him to be, has been deprived of one valuable yardstfok for
straight thinking.

He has been given an excuse--a crutch--which he

may use all his life to justify his own inab:Uity to determine what
is true or what is not true and what is just or not just.

If he has

not been encouraged to believe that truth does exist and always has
existed and always will exist, waiting to be discovered by man, this
young student may never realize his potential as a human being.

I

believe with Emerson:

We know truth when we see it, let sceptic and scoffer
say what they choose. Foolish people ask you, when you
have sooken what they do not wish to hear, 'How do you know
it is truth, and not an error of your own?' We know truth
when we see it, from opinion, as we know when we are awake
that we are awake. It was a grand sentence of Emanuel
Swedenborg, which would alone indicate the greatness of
that man's perception--'It is no proof of a man's understanding to be able to affirm whatever he Pleases; but to
be able to discern that what is true is true, and that what
is false is false--this is the mark and character of intelligence.' 7
It seems to me that there are many passages in the text,
Individual Behavior which would tend to weaken a young nerson's
belief in truth or which tend to build a feeling in him that there
is nothing one can ever depend on as true.

It can be noted in the

ex~rpts which follow that Snygg and Combs are building U? a concept

7. Brooks Atkinson, ed., The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, New
York, Random House, 1940, p. 268.
~

that there are only two sureties in this world, 1) what the ~ehaver B
thinks is true ("phenomenological") and 2) what a majority ·of eA'ternal
observers say is true or nfact."

Facts or phenomena which are true

whether anybody thinks so or not and which may exist and be true outside of both A's and~ phenomenal field, do not seeM to be provided
for at all in Snygg and Combs' theory.
In other words, our study will be directed toward establishing (1) the objective facts, that is, the facts as they are
agreed upon by external observers, and (2) the meaning of those
facts for the subject. We might call these the objective facts
and the phenomenological facts." {-o. 249)
If it can be born in mind that, according to Snygg and Combs,
these "external observers" are themselves only able to see fact according as it seems t o ~ , that--in other words--these so-called
determiners of

11

objective fact" are themselves unable to determine

fact objectively since they in turn are imprisoned by their

own

"phenomenological fields" and can only see fact phenomenologically, 8
then it must be apnarent that Snygg and Combs do not admit the
existence of a truth which does not depend upon either A or B.
11

By

external observers" the authors seem to mean a number of flesh and

blood people since the very term observer demands animateness.
attempting to clarify the point the writers say:

In

"From a phenomeno-

logical point of view •objective• facts are derived from the
phenomenal fields of several observers.

The objective facts in a

B. "No matter what we are told, our own phenomenal field will always
seem real, substantial, and solid to us. It is the only field and
the only reality we can directly experience.n ~nygg and Combs, n. 16.
{I, the 'objective observer', can, then, never be objective. He, too,
must always see things only phenomenoloiically, and his view may be
as distorted as that of ~, the behaver.!./

particular culture or subculture thus represent the least common
denominator of the phenomenal fields of a number of observers.n9
From that one can only draw the conclusion that there are only two
ki!lds of "facts" which are conceivable:

1) the "fact" which :a (the

behaver, or one's own self) thinks is true, and the "fact" which
seems to be true to a majority of people, thought of as society.
?Jowhere in the text was I able to find grounds for believing
that a fact which is true can exist which is irrespective of either
A's "fact" or B's "fact"; that fact may exist and be true unnerceived
by either A or B--a fact which is
T.

~

and which I shall speak of as

Man has always been able to conceive of T and man's urge has

cgused him to grope tcn,rrard it in different ages in spite of the
opinion of a majority of observers.

Creators of gr~at literature

as they portray character will often make use of a method which
will illustrate what I mean by T, or~ fact that,!!, regardless of
whether anybody thinks so or not.

A writer may first give us A1 s

observations and opinions of a certain character in the novel or
play or poem and this "certain character" I shall call B {behaver):

in other 'f'rords, we first see B through A's ayes or viewpoint and
thus learn one set of "facts" about B.

Next the author will show

us B's viewpoint and we will sea B's picture of himself and his set
of "facts."

Finally we find T when the writer gives us facts as

they actually exist, and this he is able to do from the third or
God-like point of vi9w which only a writer of fiction and drama

9.

Ibid., o. 249, i'ootnote 3.
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can imitate.

It is in this way that literature can sometimes give

us a stronger feeling for truth than
our daily contacts with society.

W':3

are able to receive from

"Literature is a point outside

of our hodiernal circle through which a new one may be described.
The use of literature is to afford us a platform whence we may command a view of our Present life, a nurchase by which we may move it. 1110

J.

The term exoerience as used in Individual Behavior.

The word exoerience can rave a broad meaning or a more narrow
one, but Snygg and Combs do not clarify their use of it by definition
and some confusion may result in a student's mind because of that
lack of clarification.

On nage twenty of the text is this sentence:

"Experiences are phenomenal in character and the fact that two indiduals are in the same physical situation does not even give a
relatively common ex:perience if they already differ markedly in
their phP.nomenal fields.n
The diet ionar~r defines the word experience as fo llo,vs:
1. The actual living through an event or events;
actual enjoyment or suffering; hence, the effect
upon the judgment or feelings nroduced by personal
and direct impressions; as, to know b,r experience.
4. (a) The sum total of the conscious events which
compose an individual life. (b) Observed facts and
events in contrast with what is supplied by thought;
as, knowledge originates in exnerience.
It should be noted that there is some difference in the dictionary
definitions as given in 1. and in (a) and (b) of

4.

Do

Snygg and Combs

mean by expArience to include all "conscious events" only, these being
observable facts or events, or do they mean to exclude the possibility

10.

"Circles," The Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 285.
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of a mental event such as might be described as an action of thought?
Or do they mean by experience the quite different definition which
includes as experience the "effect upon the judgment or feelings produced by personal and direct impressions?" With the latter definition
one could ca 11 eXPerience all the things which 11 happentt to a child
who spends any time with nature~all the ~observable feelings,
impressions, and judgments which a child alone with woods, fields,
streams, and sky can have.

Men like Tennyson, Wordsworth, William

Morris, Ruskin, Shakespeare, Whitman, and Emerson knew that kind of
experience. The kind of exoerience defined in the dictionary under
1.

implies impressions gained from the mental "experiencett of

reading literature or history.

Do

Snygg and Combs mean this when

they say "experience"? Or do the:, mean only "observed facts and
events in contrast with what is suoplied by thought"?

They do not

define their term other than to say that 1•expariences are phenomenal
in character."

A student, then, must draw his concl~sions as to the

exact meaning of the word from context alone.
We come to accept as our own reality the definitions
of our experience and of those who most closely affect
us ••• Out of the interaction of the child with the
world about him, tha individual comes to differentiate
more and more clearly his -phenomenal self. Obviously,
this concept can only be a function of the way he is
treated by thos~ who surround him. As he is loved or re..:.
jected, praised or punished, fails or is able to compete,
he comes gradually to regard himself as important or
unimportant, adequate or inadequate, handsome or ugly,
honest or dishonest, and even to describe himself in
terms of those who surround him. The child can only
see hiMself in terms of his experience, and in terJII~
of the treatment he receives from those responsible
for his development. He is likely ., •• to be strongly
affected by the labels which are applied to him by
other people • • • • He can only act in terms of what
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he regards as the truth about himself. Since his phenomenal
self is the result of his experience, his behavior can only
be an outgrowth of the meaning of that exoeri1=mce and he
must necessarily become in truth what he has been labelled
by the community which surrounded him. (P".'• 82, 33)
If the above statements are true, then it must also be true
that our experience--defined for~
factor determining our "reality."

!?z

others--is the most important

Experience, therefore, must mean

the "sum total of the conscious external and observable facts and
events of our lives" since the "interaction of those about him"
(society or community) is his only effective means of interpreting
his eXPeriences.

A child who 11 must become in truth what he has

been labelled by the community" has had no other kind of experience
than that which comes from the "interaction of the child with the
world about him. 11

A student might naturally conclude, then, that

by the term exuerience Snygg and Combs would exclude as ineffective
or unreal the influence of a child's thought as he reads, studies,
or contemplates nature alone.

A student might quite excusably con~

elude from what he has just read that society makes~ child~
determines~ reality of his experiences.
A thoughtful student, however, might re-examine some of those
assP-rtions.
statement:

He might, for exanrple, discover an inconsistency in this
"The child who nossesses a concept of himself as 'good'

but is called 'thief' by his parents or others surrounding him,
etc. 11 and he might ask how a child with such ttparents and others
surrounding him" could have ever possessed a good concept of himself
in the first -place.

Where did he get his concept of himself as ngood"

if this "concept can only be a function of the way he is treated by
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those who surround him"?
as

11

A child who is able to think of himself

good 11 when his parents or others have never shared that view

of him must have gotten that feeling of himself as good from another
kind of exoerience--a kind the importance of which Snygg and Combs
do not admit.

A student might believe that a child's exnerience

could be given a good meaning and definition from his mental contact with an imaginary community through literature, from individuals
and events of history, or from the "interaction" of his consciousness
with nature--completely freed from a cor.llllunity of flesh and blood
people who call him "bad" or "thief • 11

But it is to be feared that

most young students will not be so thoughtful and ·will instead
ac~ept as true their text book 1 s assertion that a child's "concept
of himself ?an onJ..y ?ea function of the way he is treated by those
who surround him" and that he "must necessarily become in truth
what he has been labelled by the conmunity ,vhich surrounds him. 11

Such assertions give no importance to the role of .either literature

or history in the development of a self which is less dependent unon
outside threat and nublic opinion, a self thereby more capable of
orig:i.nal and evolutionary thought.

Such assertions also tend to

leave the author's meaning of the ;vord exoerience unclarified in a
student 1 s mind.

4.

The te~ realit;y a.s used in Individual Behavior.

I have tried to show that many terms such as phenomenological,
fact, and P.Xperience have unique meanings for Snygg and Combs which
must be accept9d by their students.

It is

nw

opinion that these

terms as they are used in Individual Behavior have lost their
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integrity, since th~J now represent quite different concepts from
the ones for which they have always stood.
prime example of such perversion in concept.

The word reality is a
Upon acceptance of

its new usage depends one's acceptance of the whole "phenomenological"

approach or theory.

Let us see what that usage is and all that

its new meaning implies.
Dictionary definition:
1. State, character, quality, or fact of being real,
existent, self-existent or genuine, or of having real
being or existence; as, to doubt the reality of pygmies,
or matter, or of God.
2. Someone real or something real or realized; an
actual person, event, situation, or the like; an
accomplished fact; also, the substance as opposed
to the anpearance of form of a thing; •••

5.

(Philosoohy) (a) That which actual]¥ exists;
that ,vhich is not imagination, fiction, or pretense;
that which has objective existence, and is not merely
an idea.
But according to Sl\Ygg and Combs' interpretation, reality

is only what seems to be real or what seems to exist to each individual and is as variable as the pooulation of the earth.

They do

not admit the quality of truth or "isness" into their definition
of reality aqymore than they did into their definition of fact and
exDerj.ence and -ohenomena.

It is significant to note, however, that

Snygg and Combs~in their redefinition of reality--use the word
more than once with its true meaning.

In the following quotations

I shall enclose the word reality in single quotes when I think the
authors are using it to convey what seems to be real; whenever it
seems to me that they are reverting to the dictionary meaning, I
shall underline the word.

Using the same term to convey first one
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meaning and then another would tend, I think, to confuse any student,
young or old.

It /the phenomenal field7 is simply the universe of
naive exoerience in which each individual lives, the everyday situation of self and surroundings which each person
takes to be reality. To each of us the phenomenal field
of another person contains much error and illusion and seems
an :i.nteroretation of reality rather than •reality' itself;
but to the individual himself his phenomenal field is
'reality,' the only 'reality' he can know. It is much
richer, more complete, and meaningful than the objective
f:teld of the "Physical sciences, wh:tch is, in reality,
merely the shadowy and abstracted lowest conunon denominator of many phenomenal fields.
It cannot be too strongly stressed that the restriction
of 'reality' to the attenuated field of physics means a
complete abandonment of everything that we ordinarily recognize as real. (p. 15)
He may therefore agree that the behavior of others is
due to chance, repetition, habit, disease, or some other
intrusive cause from outside the 'real situation.' /footnote in the text clarifies 'real situation• as: " .-••
his own field at the moment; Each person regards his
present field as 'reality.";] (p. 35)
(Footnote to page lOJ:) This se,aration of the
phenomenal self and external realtty is in fact what
society describes as maladjustment •
• • • to make our discussion snecific and to relate
it to the current points of. view and problems of education,
we shall have to discuss se~arately two different aspects
of the phenomenal field. /Bear in mind that as statP.d
above, the phenomenal field is "simply the universe of
naive exoerience in which each individual lives, the
everyday situation of self and surroundings which each
!)arson takes to be reality."7 These aspects are (1) the
non-self part of the field,-which the individual thinks
of as his environment; and (2) the phenomenal self.
It is to the non-self aspects of the field, his
nhenomenal environment, that the individual looks for
the means of satisfying his need. Whether his immediate
goal is food, air, money, friends, or any other of the
countless goals he may seek in his effort to maintain and
enhance his Phenomenal self, he looks for it, for the
most nart, in his environment • He is always seeking some
goal, because his need to maintain and build up his
~henomenal self is insatiable. So he is constantly and
persistently exnloring this non-self nart of his field,
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which he assumes to be external reality.

(p. 207)

By the nhe~omenal self we mean those aspects of the
phenomen~l field to which we refer when we say 'L. 1 In
common with the rest of the phenomenal field it has thf3
feeling of complete reality • • • • It will be recalled
that we h~ve defined the phenomenal.field as the universe,
including himself, as it anpears to the individual at
the moment. (pp. Sb,~, passim.)

(Note:

In other words, to the phenomenal self in his nhenomenal

field which is the field of 'naive experience', everything in the
universe must be qualified by the words "as it appears" or 11 as it
seems to be" and the word "is" must be stricken from our language
as dead-wood.)
In this next and final quotation showing the usage of the
term reality, I shall omit both single quotes and italics and
let it stand upon its own merit or fault.
In the developing conceptual worlds of the various
sciences, each dealing with entities no one has ev13r
seen, each one finding explanation behind explanation,
reality behind reality, it is increasingly difficult to
reg~rd consciousness and awareness as an e~i~henomenon,
as a curfous by-product of human behavior which is witho~t significance or function.
(Note:

I have always thought that schol9rs and nhilosonhars and

noets have known almost from the beginning of recorded thought that
men's actions are caused by the action of their minds.

As I shall

point out later, awareness and consciousness are aspects of~.)
As our nineteenth century concepts of physical realit3r
as consisting only of solid little chunks of matter fade
before the wider frem~ of ~odern nhysics, such nn idea
becomes harder to accept. What we have called reality
turns out to be only eX!.)erience. /r.f this last sentence
is to be believed, then there is no such thing as a fact,
or event, or a stick or a stone, a tree or a star which
could exist unless there is a phenomenal field with its
phenomenal self living sor:i.ewhere to "experience" it .7
As the things we have taken for reality come to be -
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recognized as only schema and concepts of reality which are
acce~table for the present purposes of a oarticular science
they lose their priority as causes and we may again be
willing to acceot as a cause of behavior what conunon sense
has recognized all along, the schema and concents of the
individual himself. It would be indeed strange ~nd quite
contrary to our present conceots of biology if anything
as widespread as consciousness should have develoned and
spread unless it ,erformed an essential function in tha
survival of those orgsnisms which have it. It is our
assumption that this is correct and that the phenomenal
field is an essential factor in the efforts of the organism
to maintain its organization. In our ex11erience, in the
frame of reference we have chosen, the phenomenal field
is the behavioral field of the organism, the effective
cause of its behavior. (p. 352)
As a commentary upon the last quoted passages, and indeed many
other oarts of Individual Behavior I offer these words from Emerson:
A man's po,r19r to connect his thought with its !)roper
symbol and so to utter it, depends on the simplicity of
his character, that is, unon his love of truth an<l his
desire to communicate it without loss. The corruption
of man is followed by the corruotion of language. When
simnlicjty of character and the sovereignty of ideas is
~roken up by the prevalence of secondary desires~the
desire of riJhes, of pleasure, of power, and of praise-and duplicity· and falsehood take place of simplicity and
truth, thep::ser over nature as an interpreter of the will
is in a degree lost; new imagery ceases to be created,
and old words are perverted to stand for things which are
not; a oaoer currency is anoloyed, when t,here is no bullion
in the vaults. In due time the fraud is manifest, and
words lose all power to stimulate the understanding or
th9 affections. Hundreds of writers may be found in
every long-civilized nation who for a short time believe
and make others believe that they see and utter truths,
who do not of themselves clothe one thought in its
natural garment, but who feed unconsciously on the
language created by the primary writers of t~i country,
those, naJ!lely, who hold. Drimarily on nature.

5.

The terms uerception, awareness, differentiation,~sciousness, and mind as they are used in Individual
Behavior.

11.

"Nature,"

~

Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, p. 17.
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Snygg and Combs use the terms awareness, perception, and

differentiation synonymously, defining each one in turn by use of
the other two.
Each of us is constantly searching his field (the universe to
him) for details and meanings which will batter enable him to satisfy
his need. This nrocess involves a continuous change in the field, by
the constant rise of new characters into ground. This process, from
the noint of view of the behaver, js one of increased awareness of
details and is th~refore called dil'?erentiation. (pp. 28, 29)
Whether or not satisfaction of this need /maintenance or enhancement of his phenomenal self7 is possible for the individual
will denend unon the differentiations he is able to make in his
Dhenome~al field • • • • Those whose perceptions make nossible
th~ satisfaction of need are happy, effective, and efficient
people. On the other hand, those whose differentiations do not
permit of need satisfaction are likely to be ineffective. (pp. 115-116)
Whether or not it is possible for the individual to achieve ne~d
satisfaction will depend upon the level and unique character of the
differentiations he is able to make in his phenomenal field. If
these perceptions result in adequate behavior, all is well ••~. (p. 117)
The individual is i:ilways aware of what exists in his phenomenal
field. In fact, the field might even be described as one's personal
field of awareness. (p. 116) ;-But there are levels of awareness.7
Differentiations may exist from extreme vagUeness to very clear-=cut
well-defined perceptions • • • • (?• 116) Differentiations may thus
occur at any level of awareness ••• (116)
On the other hand, if these oarents can be assisted to perceive
JiI!lii\V 's behavior /more adequatel~7 • • • their future perceptions
w~y be vit~lly af1ected • • • • If the DP.rents can be helned to
regard Jimmy's behavior as that of a child who is upset, a whole
new series of differentiations ••• becomes possible. Such
changed oerceptions may n~ke more adequate behavior possible. (p. 118)
An even more threatening situation exists when the individual
has two or more differentiations, all of which ara highly threatening.
For the sake of simolicity, let us sunpose that only two such~,::~ptions occur.
Differentiation may be defined as knowing a difference, the
basic-act of knowledge. (p. 29)
One example of change in the field occurs in the process of
nerception, that is in the process of becoming aware of an object.
(-p. 36)
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The above examples from the text should be sufficient to show
that SrrJgg and Combs do use the terms differentiation, awareness,
and oerceotion synonymously.

The dictionary definitions of these

three terms also bear out the fact they are very closely related
terms, but that the process of differentiation must of necessity
follow and be dependent upon the processP.s of nerception and
awareness.

In other words, to differentiate at all one must first

become aware of or conscious of or must ryarceive.
Dictionary definitions:
perception:

1. Awareness of objects; conscio~sness.
2. Direct acquaintance of anything through
the senses.
3. An immediate or intuitive cognition or
judgment, often implying nice observation or subtle discrimination.

awareness:

(see aware)

aware:

Apprised; informed; congnizant; conscious;
• • • Aware usually implies vigilance in
observing or in drawing inferences from
vrhat one sees, etc • • • • Conscious
usually implies awareness of something
when one allows it to enter his mind and
usually fixes his attention u~on it.

differentiate:

l.

To distinguish by a specific
difference.
2. To ascertain or express the
specific difference of; discriminat~.

One may define differentiation as the dictionary does, or one
may say with Seygg and Combs that "differentintion may be defined
as knowing a difference" but no matter which ,vay it is exnressed
both definitions imply that awareness of perception or consciousness must precede if only for a split second the process of
differentiatj_on; that before a difference can be known between
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two ob,jects or between two of anything, awareness must first take
place.
As the ability to differentiate (know a difference or basic

act of knowledge) increases, learning, remembering, and reasoning
increases proportionately.

Differentiation, therefore, determines

learning, rememb'3ring, and reasoning and must precede in t:tme the
processes of learning, remembering, and rersoning just as awareness
must nrecede differentiation in time.

This is, as I see it, a

log:tcal Presentation of our nmental" processes and how we acquire
knowledge.

But in Individual Behavior there are sentences which

seem t.o me to confuse a student's concept of these terms.

The

,ur-oose of these passages was an obvious attempt to clarify, but
it is nossible that greater obscurity of meaning may result.
Learning may, therefore, like nerception, be considered a process of increasing differentiation of the
field • • • • It /Iearning7 is the pattern followed by
very raoid changes in the-field (perception) and by
such less rapid ones as problem solving and rote learning
by Rdults ••• In learning, as in perception the degree
and direction of differentiation are determined by the
need of the behaver and the opportunities for differentiation that are available. (p~. 38-39, passim.)
Just as perception and learning differ only in the
com:,lexity of the differentiation required, so 11 -problemsolving or "rc:Jsoning" differ from learning only in that
in "reasoning," the differentiation of procedures is in
auditory or visual terms, but not in kinesthetic terms
as it may be in "learning. 1i • • • A~ in learning and
perception • • • • "RemAmbering," like "perceiving, 11
"learning," and "reasoning," is a process of differentiation • • • • The ability of the Phenomenal anoroach to reduce such apnarentl,y diverse processes as 'nercen~ion,' 'learning,' 'reasoning,' and 'remembering'
to a single process conforming to common principles
is a welcome indication that this fr~-;ne of reference
may give us the simole orderly causal field for which
we hope: but is this one nrocess of differentiation
really adequate? (n. 3'=12, ?assiiii:')
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Snygg and Combs su.nurarize tl':eir "clarification" of the above

terms by stAting that differentiation is a single process by which
one's phenomenal field is changed according to his needs (maintaining
and enhancing s~lf.)

But from my study of the above quotations it

seems to me that differentiation is just a new way of saying mind.
The dictiona~J defines

~

as "the sum total of the indi vidua 1' s

adaptiYe activity, considered as an organized whole; remembrance;
state of being remembered; direction taken by thinking; that from
which thought originates; the subject of consciousness; that which
feels, nerceives wills, thinks; the percerytive and thinking part
of consciousness; the sum total of the conscious states of an individual; the conscious element or factor in the universe; the
qu~lity, relatedness, or tem~oral organization exhibited by a
spatial extensity, and related to it in a manner analogous to
the relation of consciousness to a conscious organism. 1t

One

wonders how the term differentiation conveys any more meaning
than the word mind conveys.
In defense of the "nhenomenoloej_cal auproach 11 as a means
of prec!icting individual behavior the authors say:

11

It avoids

and mak9s meaningless many persistent insoluble problems faced
by the external aryproach, which is unable to explain individual

behavior on the basis of its own physical frame of reference and
must necessarily ascribe individual and deviate characteristics
to other areas such as mind, ryast experience, habit, or the nervous system, which are not ooen to verification." (p. 29)
Snygg and Coobs have already themselves stated that

0?119's

Yet
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behavior de~ends u~on differentiation and have described differentiation
in .1u.st the same way that we think of mind, namely:
awareness, perception, reasoning, learning, etc.

consciousness,

They admit more

than once in their text that an individual's field is not open to
observation.

But th97 criticize the use of the mind-conceot as an

explanation for varying behavior in these words:
Behavior /under the old mind-concept7 was due to sensation or reflection, instinct or reason,
voluntary or nonvoluntary-, ,.,.as innate or learned, was emotional or rational,
was noril'.al or abnormnl. What was seen was a nercention; or
it was an illusion and therefore unreal. Prediction was
impossible because of the number of independent nrocesses
involved. After almost three centuries of study the mind
remains an explRmitOI'lJ concept only, ~ompletel:y usele~
for the study of individual behavior. (p. 343)

was

Since by their own definition and subsequent "clarification"
the ~rocesses of differentiation seem to be the same processes
which we have for a long time attributed to ~ind, the question
may arise in a student's thoughts:

are these ideas new, or are

they old·ideas in new dress? For Snygg and Combs have asserted
that one's behavior is determined by change

in

the field (differ-

entiations--mind) and thgt these changes in the field (unobservable
to the outsider) are a matter of the one process of differentiation
(pe.rception, awareness, consciousness, learning, reasoning, knowing-mind?).

Could it not be asserted just as trul;r that an individual's

behavior is determined by his mind?--When "phenomenologists" say
that control or change in an individual's behavj.or is achieved by
control or change in his "fia.ld," and that this control or change
of "field" is a process of "differentiation," are they not saying
what has been recognized for a long time by creative thinkers of
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all ages:

namely, that an individual's ~--his knowledge, awareness,

or ~erceotive powers--determines his actions?

or that an individual

is the oroduct of his thought?
The fact that one uses the·term mind to express the cause of
behavior does not necessarily mean that one must think of mind as
existing indenendently of the "organism.•• Seygg and Combs refer
to the mind-body explanation, or to the mind-body dichotomy, as
"inadequate" and so proceed to throw out t.he term "mind.it

They

use the term phenomenal field (formerly called one's background
or eJq>erience) and the :.erm differentiation (formerly thought of
as mental processes) and claim to have moved into a "new frame of

reference."

When one studies carefully their definitions and

clarification of the terms they use, when one realizes that the
words perception, awareness, and consc:J.ousness all represent man's
idea or concept of mind, one wonders what is new about this
"phenomenological" anproach or what is
of reference":

11

wider 11 about this "frame

"Once however, we are willing to move into a wider

frame of .reference and accept the common-sense concept that awareness is a cause of behavior it becomes aoparent that the phenomenal
field plays a vital role in the survival of the organlsm. 11 (l'.>. 3L9)
·Im my nrl.nd there has never been disagreement with the authors'

postulate that all behavior is caused.

My l'.>oint of departure has

been at the confusing forest of tenns a student; must thrash through
before he can arrive at last into the clearing with the simple but
.
12
"common-sense" concept that awareness is a cause of hehavior.

12.

See above, pp. 22, 2).
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However, aside from the criticism that the terminology in
Individual Behavior is difficult to master and may tend to be confusing, further appraisal should be made.

In the hands of a trained

psychiatrist who is concerned with therapy for correcting or curing
already established behavior jn problem-children or in problem-adults,
such a text as Individual Behavior should be of great value; but to a
young student?
1.

I am inclined to wonder and for four reasons:

Every exanrole of behavior cited in the text is an examnle

of unsatisfactory behavior; most of the behavior problems described
are those concerned with bodily frustration of some kind; permissiveness of an,y or all visceral experiences is the ~ey to therapy no
matter how law-level the "visceral exoeriencesn tend to be.

One

may come out of such a study feeiing the same distaste one experiences
after watching monkeys in a cage as they are sickening~y absorbed in
the contemplation and canture of their own fleas.

The concept of

the body (physical organism) and its struggle to maintain or enhance
itself as being the main motivating force of all behavior is not an
uplifting one nor is it one like~y to "nourish the spirit."
Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the
self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences
of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic
level1!nto a ~onsistent relationship with the concept of
s~lf.
Ps;s:rchological maladjustment exists i'l"hen the organism denies
to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences,
which are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of
the self-structure. When this situation exi§ts, there is
a basic or potential psychological tension.11

16. Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, Cambridge, Mass.,
The Riverside Press, 1951, n. 510.

17. Ibid., n. 513.
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Those two quotations are from the -,,,ritings of an eminent nsychotherapist and exoress the view-noint found in therapist texts such
as Axline's ~lay Therapy as well as Snygg and Combs' Individual
Behavior.
2.

I feel there is too much emphasis placed upon the importance

of adjusting to the grouo and not enough stress laid on the importance
of being an individual •. The

interpretations, definitions, and pres-

sure of "the neople -vrho surround us" may seem to our impressionable
young a sort of holy-of-holies before whom the in<lividual must
inevitably bow down.

I think the following passages illustrate that

point:
The phenomenal self is the individual's own definition of
his relationshin to the world about him • • • • For
practical purposes however, the culture in which we
move is so completely and inextri~ably a part of our
experience as to overshadow almost all else in determining the nature of the phenomenal self developed by
each of its members. Even our definitions and values
with respect to the pur~lv physical asnects of our
environment are not left entirely to our own experience
but are colored, interpreted, and valued one way or another by the culture into which we are born, ~ they ~
interpreted to us El the acts of the :,eonle 'Who surround
us. Thus even tne so=ci1Ied11 'objective factsltwhich
surround us are likely to be no more than the interpretations of the culture in which we are raised. (p. 87)
Indi victuals tend to seek self-enhancement thro11rh
ic!entifving themselves with and winning the a!)nroval
of grou~s or individuals they believe to be imoortant.
'!'his nrinciple, which forms the chief stock in trade
of the advertising industry, is one of ou~ most effective
means of social control. If it is to be used effect! vely,
it must be recognized that it is a nhenomenological princinle and not an objective one and that its effectiveness
depends u~on the individual customer's system of values.
(p. 187)
Every individual lives in and is dependent unon society.
So long as his behavior is ~onsistent with the exnectance

32
of the members of society he operates smoothly and effectivefyand with amininru.m orthreat to himself from that
society. Since he is de~n<lent upon his society in large
part for his need satisfaction, he cannot operate in ~ys
which would deprive him of it. (p. 138)
While the child is born into a world of physical objects, even these are subjected to the narticular interpretations of the culture so that the nhenomenal self becomes
overwhelmingly the ~roduct of the culture. For most of us,
the nhenomenal self we develop is a direct outgrowth of the
culture matrix of our parents and early guardians • • • •
From them we learn to define the-world about us in
terms of the culture into which we are born. We come to
accept as our own reality the definitions of our exnerience
and of those who most closely affect us ••••
Out of interaction of the child with the world about
him, the individual comes to differentiatemore and more
clearly his phenomenal self. Obviously, this concent CE!n
only be a function of the way he is treated by those who
surround-him. Since his phenomenal self is the result of
his exoerience, 'his behavior can only be an outgrowth of
the ffieaning of that experience and he must necessarily
become in truth what he has been labelled by the community
which surrounded him. (pp. 82, BJ, ~assim:J --/schools today should7 provide each pupil with every
possible opoortunity-to think of himself' as a responsible
citizen and contributing member of society •. They would
see that he has the widest possible opnort.unity to identify
with and be accepted ~ the socially desirable individuals
and groups which he admires, so that he will feel accepted
~ and acceutable to society.-Incidentally, an individual
who feels himself identified~ and accepted by! society
cannot attack it. To do so would be to attack himself.
{!). 221)
There is certainly no place in such a theory for the child who
stands out from the others in an,y way or for the child who is
"different."

And although in a totalitarian state it may be de-

sirable to raise up a people who "cannot attack its society" why
should it be so vital to do so in a democracy?
I feel our most urgent need in education just now is to help
our young !J80ple to believe in themselves, to be individually strong,
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and to be morally sure of what is just and wh1t is unjust--what is
true and what is untrue.
~

society

~

only be

~

Our principle for educating should bet.his:
good

~ ~

its individuals.

Those indi vi-

duals should be given, through education, something to believe in.and
values they can depend upon.
Edgar Ansel Mowrer has made some -pertinent statements on this
subject in his recent article "Return to Integrity."
~oting David Riesman7 "Why,n asks Riesman innocently, are
American young people-so frequently aimles~, lacking private
oassions and pursuits" (in other words half dead) "'when a
greater variety of skilled cAreers are open to them than
ever before?"
Obviously, bec3usa they have been trained to eschew
private nassions and pursuits (the thrills of life) and
pursue only the inevitably tenid aims "'hich they find they
have in common.
MtJ own conversion to non-comformity began at an early
age. More specifically, it started when, at the age of
ten or twelve, I became aware that the n;ost interesting
distinction among pe::ple of all ages whom I knew was between the many who accepted group standards as authoritative
and the fewwhostubbornly insisted on thinkiiig things out

for tne~se!ves."
"E pur si muove."

-

-

This brought me into some conflict both in the oublic
schools and a couple of American universities which I attended. It also brought me some personal uncertainty
especially when I discovered that at the state university
conformity both of intellect arxi habits was all but indisPensable to the high9st success. Could individUAlism be
wr'Jng?
Nevertheless, I stuck it out. I was fortified by
what I read about great individuals and by the few really
great people I began to meet--Jane Addams, Henrik Christian
Andersen, and President Thomas Uasaryk of Czechosolvakia.
I also found comfort in certain writers. I can remember my
joy when, studying in the freer atmosphere of the University
of Paris, I came upon the nassage by Nietzche (well ~nown,
but not to me):
"The surest way to corrunt a youth is to instruct him
to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those
who think differently." • • • •
Enoueh therefore to explain that, for me, the good
life is the search for excellence. Excellence at its
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origin can be only individual. Man's will is free. It follows
therefore that the deliberate furthering of social adjustment
as the highest human aim is immoral. The alternative to
"integrationn i's""perscrialintegrity based £!! nersonal responsibility.
Men and women do not achieve integrity by pursuing the
negative virtues~adjustment, security, or even conventional
haouiness • • • • They achieve excellence {and the highest
happiness) by accepting burdens. A healthy peo~le thrives
under troubles, as our ancestors well knew. Tocqueville
says of the Americans of his time:
"Life would have no relish if they were delivered from
the anxieties which harass them.n
What a change from the processions of defeated folk
troooing to the osychiatrist in search of 11 adjustmentn.
and of the courage to accept, each, "his differencen (to
quoteFrost) • • • -.--- - Against these great imnersonal factors making for
co!lformity a call for individualism is like defeated Roland's
horn at Roncevalles--msrel,y ttsad." Self-direction is as
antiqw=ited as kpight--errantry. (And anyhow r.1ost neople,
craving the warmth of the herd, are hapnier when integrated
and incapable of making decisions.)
This--the argument of the 11 integrators 11 --is powerful.
It is founded on the firm conviction that habies are th:!
"raw material of character patterns" and therefore "infinitely educable." In consequence, environment, the 1•impersonal factors," are definitive and bucking tram is like
trying to stop a lava flow.
But supuose the heredity champions are right and
people come into this world basically pretty much as they
will remain during their lives? If personality is inborn
rather than shaped, then what? George Santayana has
written:
"In the oast or the future my language and my borrowed
knowledge would have been different. But under whatever
sky I had been born, since it is the same sky, I should
have had the ~ ohilosophy. 11
If Santayana is right, then against the ''impersonal
factors" of our time the greatest imnersonal factor of all
is oresent and working against excessive "adjustment .n I
mean, what is called human nature. Then against every
overdevelooment, every deformation, rrankind at a certain
moment will react and correct the balance. This has happened before. The English reacted to the excessive
contriction of Puritanism with the license of the Restoration. Germans fled from the slop?y romanticism of Sturm
und Drang into a stony Sachlichkeit that still ma{es them
the terror of their neighbors. Prohibition turned sober
Americans into bootleggers and ginbibhers.
Having lived among many neoples, from individu~list
France to totalitarian Russia, Italy, and Germany, I have
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come to agrge with Santayana. I find human nsture to be
the most stable of all 1mown factors. Within mankind are
macy who must conforrri;' some few who are incurably selfdirected, al')d, in the middle, a mass of undecided wh0 can
go either w•:iy. The difference between soci.ety and society
is therefore not a matter of the relative numbers of the
three tynes. These seem roughly constant. It is a n:atter
of the relative ?restige and influence of the tyi,es at a
given moment. Vihen, as in the modern world, material advan~age has magnified the value of uniformity, the undecided
combine with the "integrators" to glorify a sheeplike conformity. When, to the contrary, the self-directed prevail
official educators encourage individualism and the society
goes in for hero worshio. Human nature, instinctively
seeking so~ial health, regularly corrects an excess.
All this may seem far-fetched. But in my eyes it is
simole fact. Unon it I base my view that today, when the
adjustment drive has reached the point of caricature, when
the external •~i.amersonal factors" are urging men to be insects, human nature is already quietl! busy erecting! wall
against further encroachment • • • • 3
Mr. Mowrer and I are not alone in our concern for the imoortance
of the individual as against that of the herd.
John Stuart· Mill

W"'!S

Over a century ago

aware of the same threat to the individual

whenever too much stress is placed upon the denands of society.

He

expressed his concern in these words:
In sober truth, wh~tever homage may be orofessed, or even
paid, to real or sup,osed mental superiority, the general
tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. In ancient history,
in the Middle Ages, and in a diminishing degree through the
long transition from feudality to the Present time, the
individual was a power in himself; and if he had either
great talents or a high social position, he was a considerable power. At nresent individuals are lost in the crowd.
In ryolitics 1r-is almost a triviality to say that nublic
opinion now rules the world. The only ~ower deserving the
name is th!it of masses, and of governments while they make
themselres the organ of the tendencies and instincts of
masses.
It is desirable, in short, that in things which do
not nrimarily concern othrs, individuality should ~ssert
itself. Where, not the nerson 1 s own character, but the

13. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, "Return to Integrity," The Saturday Review
of Literature, February 5, 19.55, np. 36-lil, nassinl.

1L.

John Stu.qrt Mill, Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Reoresentati ve
Government, New York, E. P. Dutton & Co., 1910, 'nn: 38-41, passim.

36
traditions or customs of other oeople are the rule of
conduct, there is wanting one of the nrincinal ingredients
of human hanniness, and quite 1~he chief ingredient of indh'idua 1 and socia 1 nrogr'3ss •..;
It is, I believe, just as imnortant in this century that our young
students do not conclude from their readings in modern textbooks
1) th8t to conform is better or 2) that non-conformity meanR mal-

adjustment.

3.

It seems to me that the so-called

11

phenomenological"

anoroach tends to threRten values a student might have about
truth or goodness, since nothing is real except what seems to be

·--

.

real to the behaver and since nothing is true but what seems to be
true and since facts can no longer be deoended unon to exist
11

whether anybody thinks so or not. 11

The

idea that an individual

has no choice of action since his need to enhance self regulates
all action is a concept which may tend to tqar down a student's
nreconceivec belief in the power of the will or in the inrr:)ortance
cf princinle.
If the

11

ohenomenological 11 theory is adooted as

a

sole -prdlosonhy

of education, then the words ideal, orincinle, will-power, truth, and
goodness must become outworn t3rrns for outworn concents.

4. I believe Snygg and Combs have overlooked one very important
aspect of behavior control in their text:

the pl~ce of literature,

history, And nature in the organization of self.

Snygg and Combs

stress the importance of the ~henomenal self, the enhancement and
maintaining of which :ts the cause of all behavior.

lSo

Ibid., P• 115.

But they also
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say the self is lArgely determined and molded by the community,
nublic or,inion, society.

They treat <it length ways in which the

self is threaten'9d a!1d changed by this external pressure, but
they do not mention or stress one potent factor in the building
of an "adequate" "?henomenal self or a concept of self as "good."
It is not mentioned in the text nor is it imnlied that Poetry,
a study of history, and contact with nature can and do orovide
the best possible means of "organizing" the self, which in turn
?rovides the needed behavior control.
By nature I :i.nclude a wide range of influences.

There is

the simnle contemnlation of nature which satisfies the human need
for beauty (enhancement? or maintenance?) and which may be experienced by all children regardless of bad teachers or bad parents.
(Believe me, there

~

"bad 11 teacl.,ers and there are

11

badtt parents,

and this I state as a fact according to Russell and not as
according to Snygg and Combs.

a

fact

The daily newspa?ers with accounts

of what happens to some children at the hands of some narents and
some teAchers substantiate my assertion.)

By nature I also include

the field of ph.vsic3l science, for from the study of such truths as
are revealed by exoerimentation arise an awareness of and a resuect
for a higher cause than man has yet discovered.
By Poetry I mean of course the whole field of literature from

fable to novel, essay, poetry, and drama.
own

Each form 11rovides its

unique medium for enriching a "behaver' s fi13ld" and nrovides

a yardstick for his subsequent behavior which is not de".>endent
upon the "threat II of parents, teachers, or friends.
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The same kind cf yardstick for moral values can be obtained
from a "behaver's" study of history.

The child "differentiates"

(Perceives, learns, reasons) from inward "exoerience'l rather than
from external events (outward "experience) mainly.

As a result,

his self-conce'Dt may become and remain good in spite of his community.

To say that poetry, history, and nature

11

feed the soul, 11

or "mind," or "spirit" is incompatible with a theory such as Snygg
and Combs' "phenomenological" control of b~havior.

One does not

speak in such terms when travelling the modern psychologist's path.
Integ~ity, character, truth, goodness, and beauty seem to be oldfashion~d words for non-existent concepts, i f everything is relative
in this world of ours, if nothing can be depended u~on as being true,
and if the individual must become "in truth" the product of and subservient to the group.
Young peoole need to have values given to them, not taken away.
The danger in relying solsly on a theory such as that of Snygg and
Combs in education lies just there.
The Measuro

2£ Man

Joseph Wood Krutch in his book

has voiced his awareness of that danger effectively.

To say that the world could be saved by a solution of its
rnor~l problems would sound unconvincing enough to most
people. What~~ ~re ~roposing seems even less promisin~.
What it comes down to is salvation, not through the solution of the ~roblems of morality, but through the mere
recognition that tney exist.
Yet one must start somewhere i f one is to st~rt at
all, and the whole trend of this discussion has been to
suggest that there is no other place to st~rt. Grant
th3 premise, either that human freedom does not exist
or even that it is too limited to be worth taking into
account, and there is no breaking the chain of logic
which leads ultimately to the oo~ition of the most extre:r.ta proponents of "hurnan engineering" as the only
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method of dealing with man or h:ts nroblems. Grant his contentions
and there is YlO breaking the chain which leads in its turn to
some sort of totalitarian society. If, on the other hand,
everrthing which has been or ever will be was not fixed and
inevitable from the dawn of creation, then it must be because
of either a random element iYl the universe or because art effective freedom to choose exists somewhere. And there seems
no more likely place where it micht reside than in man himself.
If he is to use +.his freedom actually to move the world, if he
is not merely to be moved by it, then he must have some point
outside the world of the physically and mentally determined on
which to rest his lever. That fulcrum cannot be anything else
except "values" deliberately chosen.
Thus, however limited h'-l1118n freedom may be, the freedom,
if it exists at all, is unique, and given a lever ~ith which
to operate, there is no guessing how ~owerful a force the free
man may exert. To say this is not to s~y that rulers, educators,
nublicists, and social workers should henceforth rely on nothing
except man as a free moral agent and therefore on his omver to
choose his values and govern his conduct. But it does ):~an that
they must not leave any of these things out of account.

18. Joseph Wood Krutch, The Measure of Man, New York, The BobbsMerrill Co., Inc., 1953, pp. 256-257.~ ~~
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